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JUVENILE COURTS AND THE LEGACY OF '67
MONRAD G. PAULSENt
Gerald Gault allegedly made a telephone call to a woman living in
his neighborhood during which he used some obscene words and phrases.
The telephoning violated an Arizona statute' and hence Gerald, aged
sixteen, was subject to adjudication as a juvenile delinquent. An adjudica-
tion was in fact made after a proceeding which failed to offer him the
basic procedural protections to which he would have been entitled had
been charged in a criminal court for making the call. The youth's case
found its way to the Supreme Court of the United States and in May,
1967, the high court decided It re Gault,' holding that some of the infor-
mal procedures which have characterized practice in juvenile courts for
over sixty-five years violated the Constitution.
Gault established four propositions of constitutional law directly
applicable to juvenile courts throughout the country. First, every fact-
finding hearing held to determine whether a young person has comimtted
the acts alleged in a delinquency petition "must measure up to the essen-
tials of due process and fair treatment."3 Second, though the opinion of
the Court expressly refused to demand "that the hearing.., must con-
form with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual
administrative hearing,"' due process does require the giving of written
notice of a specific charge "sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit
preparation."' Third, in delinquency proceedings "which may result in
commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed,
the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child."6 Fourth, a
juvenile respondent has the right to remain silent, fully protected by the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to be confronted by
sworn witnesses who are subject to cross-examination by the respondent's
counsel.
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAWYERS
How will the recognition of the rights affect the work of the nation's
"Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. Id. at 30, quoting frmo Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
4. Id.
5. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
6. Id. at 41.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
juvenile courts? The question is impossible to answer unless we know how
the right to counsel is to be implemented and what the lawyers will do.
Procedural protections in courts employing an adversary system are not
likely to have much practical significance if lawyers are not present to
press for them on behalf of clients. On the other hand, vigorous lawyers
insisting that respondents be given the full advantage of Gault will turn
the formulation of that opinion into a living reality. Such lawyers, com-
ing before juvenile judges in substantial numbers, will change the
practices in many courts.
How many lawyers can we expect to appear for respondents on
delinquency petitions? The answer to the question will depend, in large
part, on how conveniently lawyers are made available to juveniles. If ask-
ing for a lawyer means a substantial delay in the proceedings, the right to
counsel is likely to be waived by a youngster and his parents. In many
cases working fathers and mothers will not choose to come back another
day when an assigned lawyer can be present. The feeling, "let's get it
over with," must be very strong. We know, however, from experience in
New York City under the New York Family Court Act' that if lawyers
are coveniently provided, their assistance is readily accepted. In New
York City, legal aid lawyers called "law guardians"8 are housed in the
Family Court buildings. To consult with counsel, therefore, involves no
delay. According to the most recent statistics, ninety-six percent of all
youngsters called to respond to a delinquency petition were represented by
counsel-ninety-two percent by the law guardians of the Legal Aid
Society.'
Not only will large scale utilization of a lawyer's assistance in
delinquency cases depend upon immediate access to counsel but also upon
the way in which counsel is offered by the judge or court attendant.
Consider the difference between these two invitations: 1) "I hereby in-
form you that, if you want a lawyer, you are entitled to have one and I
will assign counsel if you cannot pay but, if you would like to proceed
without counsel, you may do so without prejudice;" 2) "Mr. Smith, a
law guardian, has been informed about your case and is ready to assist
you so that your right to counsel may be fulfilled. Is it agreeable with
you if Mr. Smith represents you?" Surely the latter invitation will result
in more respondents choosing to use legal assistance than the former.
The importance of the right to counsel in juvenile courts will also
turn on how zealous, competent, and loyal the assigned lawyers turn out
7. N.Y. FAmILY CT. Acr (McKinney 1963).
8. This is the term used in the authorizing statute. N.Y. FAmLmy CT. ACT
§ 242 (McKinney 1963).
9. JUDICIAL. CONF. OF THE STATE OF NEW YO1x, TwELFrTH ANNUAL REPORT 289
(1967).
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to be. Experience with problems involved in providing counsel in criminal
cases teaches us that the mode of organizing defender services is all-
important in assuring zeal, competence, and loyalty to a client. The law-
yers assigned must be paid an adequate fee (or salary). A public or vol-
untary defender organization can provide lawyers who quickly gain the
special skills useful in juvenile courts. In all but the least populated areas
with very small caseloads, a relatively short list from which private prac-
titioners are chosen can also become a list of attorneys specially qualified
for juvenile court. Any scheme which brings a particular lawyer into
juvenile court only one every year or two is not likely to produce much
effective legal assistance for respondents.
NOTES FROM THE FIELD ABOUT COUNSEL
What has happened in the juvenile courts of the United States since
Gault in respect to implementing the right to counsel? In preparation for
this article a number of juvenile court judges were asked about develop-
ments in their respective states and sixteen replies were received repre-
senting fifteen states."0 Information was also gathered from three other
states-New York, Ohio and Oregon. While the information is frag-
mentary and unrefined, it is nevertheless instructive. The replies mirror
the concerns of the judges, some emerging problems are generally noted,
and some trends can be identified.
In many of the larger cities throughout the country, public or
voluntary defender services have been extended to juvenile courts since
the Gault decision. Judge Rubin of Denver reports that "the public defen-
der is now beginning to enter Juvenile Court in Denver, but because of
an insufficient budget, it is not yet prepared to routinize its appearances
with us."" Judge Noyes of Montgomery County, Maryland, reports
that "[o]ur County Council has recently enacted a local ordinance
establishing a Public Defender's office which would serve the Juvenile
10. The following lettres from juvenile court judges to the author of this Article
have provided information respecting practice in various states: From Judge Ted Rubin
of Denver, Colorado, February 9, 1968; Judge Margaret C. Driscoll of Bridgeport,
Connecticut, February 6, 1968; Judge Mary D. Adams, Idaho Falls, Idaho, March 22,
1968; Judge Walter P. Dahl of Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), February 5, 1968;
Judge Creed D. Tucker, Urbana, Illinois, February 15, 1968; Judge Harold N. Fields,
Indianapolis, Indiana, February 5, 1968; Judge John L. McKinney, Ames, Iowa,
February 5, 1968; Judge Malcolm G. Copeland, Topeka, Kansas, February 7, 1968;
Judge James C. Gulotta, New Orleans, Louisiana, February 7, 1968; Judge Alfred D.
Noyes, Rockville, Maryland, February 6, 1968; Judge James H. Lincoln, Wayne
County, Michigan (Detroit), February 13, 1968; judge Lindsay G. Arthur, Minneapolis,
Minnesota, February 7, 1968; Judge Wilfred W. Nuernberger, Lincoln, Nebraska,
February 8, 1968; Judge B. Gordon Gentry, Greenbsoro, North Carolina, March 5,
1968; Judge E. F. Ziegler, Ogden, Utah, February 6, 1968; Judge Edwin A. Henry,
Norfolk, Virginia, February 15, 1968.
11. Rubin letter, supra note 10.
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Court as well as adult courts."' 2 From Chicago we learn that legal service
offices funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity, the public defen-
der's office, and a research project of the National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges have combined to make "approximately eight" lawyers
available to the juvenile court. Further, two additional public defenders
were added in February, 1968, and one more will be assigned soon."
According to Judge Fields of Indianapolis, lawyers there are being
supplied by the legal aid office and the legal services offices of the
O.E.O." In Ogden, Utah, legal services are provided by an O.E.O,
funded legal services office. 5 Similarly, in Minneapolis and Cleveland
defender service in the juvenile court comes from legal aid societies which
have been partially funded by the O.E.O. 6
A news story from Virginia reminds us that local bar associations
in many communities will probably undertake to organize legal services
in juvenile court:
[t]he recently formed Junior Bar Section of the Norfolk-
Portsmouth Bar has taken over the task of providing represen-
tation for indigents in juvenile court proceedings in the Nor-
folk-Portsmouth area.
Peter Rowe, Chairman of the Norfolk-Portsmouth Junior
Bar stated that his group was requested by the Norfolk-
Portsmouth Senior Bar Association to provide legal representa-
tion in the juvenile courts. The request came as a result of the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case of In re Gault
which required that a juvenile be afforded counsel in any hear-
ing which might result in the juvenile's commitment to an insti-
tution in which his freedom would be curtailed. The Norfolk-
Portsmouth Junior Bar responded in formal session by over-
whelmingly endorsing a resolution to commit the members of
the section to provide the required juvenile court representation."
New legislation in Connecticut, Nebraska, and Ohio has pro-
vided for the payment of assigned counsel in juvenile court.' In
some places county governments have approved claims for payment
(e.g., downstate Illinois)"' or the funds to pay fees have been put in the
12. Noyes letter, supra note 10.
13. Dahl letter, supra note 10.
14. Fields letter, supra note 10.
15. Ziegler letter, supra note 10.
16. Arthur letter, supra note 10; Address by Judge John J. Toner, Ohio Association
of Juvenile Court Judges, Jan. 23, 1968.
17. The Docket (Junior Bar Section, Virginia State Bar Ass'n), Dec. 1967, at 3.
18. CoNN. P.A. 630 (Jan. Sess. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. ch. 247 (Supp. 1967);
OHIo RFv. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Baldwin 1968).
19. Tucker letter, supra note 10.
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juvenile court budget (Montgomery County, Maryland).2 A New
Orleans judge rewards lawyers who serve in juvenile court without pay
with appointments as paid counsel in adoption cases." In many states,
however, especially in the rural counties, not even this sort of scheme for
paymernts exists.
Whatever the scheme for providing counsel, lawyers are generally
being made available to juveniles in serious delinquency cases. We have
little information, however, on the all-important question of how clearly
the right to counsel is being explained and how conveniently lawyers are
being made available. Nor do we know, generally, in what proportion of
cases lawyers are being appointed, though the Wall Street Journal has
reported a general impression among judges that the number of lawyers
appearing and the number of contested cases has increased:
[j]uvenile court dockets are jammed with pending cases as
more juveniles demand lawyers... Kenneth Turner, a Memphis
juvenile judge, notes a 15%o rise in the number of contested
cases in his court since the Gault decision. Judges in Phoenix,
Denver, Houston and Miami report similar increases.2
This report is confirmed by some of the correspondence received by the
author.
Through parents and children are most often told of their rights
orally by a probation officer or court attendant as well as the judge, in
some places mimeographed forms have been devised which inform both a
respondent and his parents respecting the respondent's rights and which
accompany the notice that proceedings are to be begun. The following is
taken from a form used in Multnomah County (Portland), Oregon:
1. You have the right to remain silent and need not
answer questions or discuss the facts with the judge, police
officer, juvenile court counselor, or anyone else. If you do discuss
with anyone the facts of the alleged violation of the law with
which you are charged, your statements may be used against you
at any later hearing of the charge. You may have the help of
your attorney if one is employed, before you discuss the facts
with anyone.
2. You have the right to be represented by an attorney.
If you are unable to afford an attorney, the judge will appoint
one to represent you if the judge is convinced that you and
20. Tucker letter, supra note 10.
20. Noyes letter, supra note 10.
21. Gulotta letter, mtpra note 10.
22. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1967, at 1, col. 1, and at 18, col. 2.
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your parents do not have the money to employ one. (Ask the
counselor about making application for the appointment of an
attorney).
3. You have the right to an attorney and the right to
remain silent. You do not have to be represented by an attorney
and you do not have to remain silent.
4. You may give up the right to be represented by an
attorney or the right to remain silent. You can give up these
rights by telling the judge that you wish to do so or by telling
this to your counselor.
The written advisements such as this are designed to facilitate
waiver of the constitutional rights recognized in Gault. Because of these
forms, if will be more difficult to claim that the existence of rights was
not understood than if rights had only been explained orally.
In Lane County (Eugene), Oregon, the written explanation of
rights is accompanied by the following express form for waiver:
Knowing that I have the above rights and understanding
what the rights are, I decide as follows:
I want to have an attorney:Is/
I do not want to have an attorney: Is/.
I want to talk about these charges: Is/
I do not want to talk about these charges: /s/-
I approve of the above decisions made by my child:
Parent
The greater the number of waivers, the less trouble Gault creates for the
juvenile court judge. 3
When lawyers come to juvenile court, the work of the court changes.
Cases will demand more judicial talent, take more time and require more
expenditure. Judge Rubin of Denver writes:
... we have had a few more delinquency injury trials and cer-
tainly more adversary type trials and hearings. I have heard
great legal advocacies on motions to suppress evidence; whether
a lineup meets due process; the admissibility of school social
worker testimony regarding truancy records; motions for bond
(the Code provides for bond); whether there is authority to
pay transportation fees for out of state witnesses; whether the
23. For a more extended discussion of the waiver problem, see text accompanying
notes 82-94 supra.
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Juvenile Court has jurisdiction on a childhood murderer when
the Code says that it does; and many others.2'
The increase in the number and complexity of legal issues raised will
present special difficulities for those juvenile court judges who are not
lawyers.
Judge Toner of Cuyahoga. County (Cleveland), Ohio, stated, in
respect to his county: "[t] he immediate availability of . . . lawyers has
increased the number of denials of charges and, therefore, required more
time for the hearings ... also the number of motions ruled upon has been
increased." 2 Judge Lincoln of Wayne County (Detroit), Michigan, also
reports that more lawyers have meant more trial time. He writes:
"Wayne County now has five full-time Referees in place of three, and two
more will be added before the end of the year (total-seven Referees).""
The Wall Street Journal story asserted "juvenile court costs are
skyrocketing."2 In Detroit, the referees about whom Judge Lincoln
wrote are attorneys who hear juvenile cases and are paid about seventeen
thousand dollars per year. The possible added expense has worried
Judge Henry of Norfolk, Virginia:
... in 1967 we had slightly [over] four thousand new files on
the Juvenile side of the Court and if we were required to pro-
vide counsel in every one of these cases, we probably would have
to have four or five Juvenile Courts, instead of one. This is no
hundred percent reason for denying anyone the right of counsel,
but [it] seems to me that any procedure can be followed to
unnecessary excess and that this is a definite possibility follow-
ing the impact of the Gault decision throughout our country.28
The total bill is increased by the more frequent use of lawyers to
represent petitioners in delinquency proceedings (dare we call them
prosecutors?). Judge Whitlach of Cleveland has recently written, "[t]he
Gault decision will doubtless result in the prosecutor's office being called
upon to assist the Court in the trial of delinquency cases."2 His colleague,
Judge Toner, spoke of more prosecutorial time being devoted to juvenile
cases in Cuyahoga County and Lake County, Ohio.3" Judge Noyes of
Montgomery County, Maryland said, "[i]n one County, the State's
24. Rubin letter, supra note 10.
25. Address, supra ncte 16.
26. Lincoln letter, supra note 10.
28. Henry letter, supra note 10.
29. Whitlatch, The Gault Decision-Its Effect on the Office of Prosecuting
Attorney, 41 OHio B. J. 41 (January 8, 1968).
30. Address, supra note 16.
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attorney or an assistant is prosecuting each case."'" In Bridgeport,
Connecticut, the juvenile court "is also paying for court advocates... for
contested delinquency and neglect hearings in the adjudicatory stage." 2
The term "court advocate" is a new one, designed to avoid the suggestion
that anyone is "prosecuting" a juvenile.
If defense lawyers come in to juvenile court, this noted increase in
representation for the petitioner is likely to continue. Not many will be
surprised by Judge Toner's statement, "[i] n a few instances the lawyers
[for the respondent] have demanded a prosecutor as they feel they cannot
adequately represent their clients in anything but a strictly adversary
proceeding." 3 Without prosecutors (or "court advocates" or perhaps
"counsel to petitioner") there is no one to interview the petitioner and his
witnesses prior to trial, no one to marshal the evidence carefully, no one
(except the judge) to conduct the direct examination of the petitioner and
his witnesses, and no one to cross-examine the respondent and his
witnesses (except the judge). The problems created can be further
aggravated by heavy calendars.
The burden on the judges when lawyers appear in juvenile court is
increased also by the typical lack of law secretaries and legal assistants.
The new questions of law now being raised demand research t provide
reasoned, written opinions.
Under some of the state statutes and some court practices, counsel is
offered not only in delinquency cases and in cases involving "persons in
need of supervision" (habitual truants and youngsters who are beyond
the control of their parents) where such children are a distinct legal
category, but also in neglect and dependency matters. In other places only
children who are respondents on a delinquency petition are offered counsel.
For example, Judge Gulotta of New Orleans states, "[w]e have limited
our appointment to apply only to delinquency cases and not neglect. ....34
Some of the correspondence indicates practices that attempt to
restrict offers of counsel to the more serious cases or to cases in which the
respondent denies the charge. For example, judge Henry of Norfolk,
Virginia says:
[a] t the present time, this Court offers Counsel to any indigent
child, if he is charged in a juvenile petition with an act which
would be a felony, if committed by an adult. Furthermore, we
offer Counsel, private or Court appointed, to any child who may
31. Noyes letter, supra note 10.
32. Driscoll letter, supra note 10.
33. Address, supra note 16.
34. Gulotta letter, supra note 10.
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lose his liberty by commitment to our State Department of
Welfare and Institutions.
.... We do not provide Counsel for the average misdemeanor
case, but do use a type of Waiver form and we explain to the
child and his parents that he is entitled to Counsel if he desires to
retain Counsel, and in most instances, it is agreeable that
Counsel be waived in these cases of somewhat lesser importance."
Judge Lincoln of Detroit reports that counsel is offered in "all delin-
quency cases where there is any possibility of the juvenile being removed
from the parents or guardian."36 Judge Gentry of Greensboro, North
Carolina tells us, "[a] ttorneys are being furnished whenever a juvenile is
charged with a delinquency act which may result in his being committed
to a correctional institution, and where the child denies the act."37 Judge
Mary Adams of Idaho Falls, Idaho writes: "[1] egal counsel is provided
upon proof of indigency whenever there is a denial of allegations in the
juvenile petition, and where action by the court may result in change of
custody."38 Similarly, Judge Gulotta records that in New Orleans, "the
court advises the juvenile of his Constitutional rights at the hearing when
the juvenile denies the allegations as set forth in the petition....""
In September, 1967, the Supreme Court of New Jersey amended its
court rules relating to the juvenile courts. In order to avoid assigning
counsel in all juvenile cour cases the rules provide that the juvenile
court operate with two hearing calendars--the formal and the informal.
"All juvenile complaints which in the opinion of the judge may result
in the institutional commitment of the juvenile shall be listed on the
formal calendar."4 Juveniles on the formal calendar "shall" be provided
with representation by counsel. Thus the difficult issues of whether a
minor can waive counsel and of whether counsel has voluntarily been
waived in a given case are avoided. In addition, the juvenile court judge
may request the prosecutor to appear in cases put on the formal calendar.
While complaints listed on the informal calendar "shall be conducted in
summary manner,"4 1 at any stage of proceeding on the informal calendar
the court may transfer the complaint to the formal calendar for a de novo
hearing.
One may doubt whether the New Jersey scheme will succeed in its
purpose. It is true that Gatdt emphasized the fact that Gerald lost his
35. Henry letter, supra note 10.
36. Lincoln letter, supra note 10.
37. Gentry letter, supra note 10.
38. Adams letter, supra note 10.
39. Gulotta letter, supra note 10.
40. N.J. CT. R. 6:9-1c, d, e.
41. Id.
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freedom through commitment to a state institution and expressly stated
that the right to counsel must be offered in such a case. Gault does not
say, however, that counsel is not reuired in other cases. In fact, in Kent
v. United States,2 the Supreme Court emphasized the need for prode-
dural protections where a decision, described as "critically important" and
"of tremendous consequences," was being made. But a case on the infor-
mal calendar also may result in an adjudication of "delinquency." The
adjudication destroys reputation and harms the young respondent. It may
be a factor in later receiving severe treatment as a second offender.
Indeed, under the New Jersey rule only commitment to an institution is a
disposition forbidden a judge hearing cases on the informal calendar. He
may remove a child from his home by "placing" him in someone else's
custody or with a public or voluntary child welfare agency."3 Further, the
judge limits freedom simply by the imposition of a regime of probation
on the child. Are not decisions followed by such results "critically
important" and of "tremendous consequences ?"
The New Jersey rule permits counsel to participate in hearings on
the informal calendar if the juvenile is represented by a privately retained
lawyer. If respondents whose parents have means may enjoy the assist-
ance of counsel, does the equal protection clause permit a state to deny
such assistance to the children of the poor? It does not push Griffin v.
Illinois" or Douglas v. California45 too far to suggest that the principle
underlying those opinions requires us to recognize here an "invidious dis-
crimination" against the poor.
A legislative change in California after Gault provides that counsel
must be appointed for children who are in juvenile court because of ha-
bitual failure to obey parents, violation of the criminal law, or failure to
obey a lawful order of the court.48
THE LAWYER'S ROLE
It has so far been argued that if lawyers come into juvenile courts in
large numbers the operation of these courts will be greatly changed. Is
this true because lawyers operate badly, even heartlessly in juvenile court?
Judge Whitlach of Cleveland has said, "[a] few members of the Bar
proceed with the attitude that they are the savior of the child if they can
prevent an adjudication of delinquency, despite the validity of the com-
plaint and the obvious need of the child for the care and protection that
42. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
43. N.J. CT. R. 6:9-1c, d, e.
44. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
45. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
46. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634 (West Supp. 1967). Sec. 3, subsection 634.
JUVENILE COURTS
the court can give him. '4 7 His complaint has been echoed by Judge
Toner: "[a] n increasing number of lawyers proceed with the attitude that
they must prevent an adjudication of delinquency regardless of its validity
and the obvious needs of the child and the assistance that can be provided
by the court."4
Do these comments mean that lawyers should not move to suppress
illegally obtained evidence if suppression would release a guilty youth who
"needed" treatment? Should a child's lawyer not challenge the use of a
confession taken in violation of law if the statement seems quite trust
worthy? If parents and child decide to invoke the right of silence should
not the attorney assist them to vindicate the right? The assigned lawyer
is assigned as the child's lawyer, the child's advocate. Is there not some-
thing of a fraud involved in suggesting an undisclosed but a more uncle-
like role for counsel? Will not the respondent and his parents count on the
lawyer to be an advocate--one who will carry out their instructions?
Indeed, is a lawyer trained to be ise regarding the question: does this
child need treatment from the state?
The New York Family Court Act,49 establishing the "law guardian"
system-the most comprehensive design for organizing legal services in
children's courts-contains little to indicate that the New York legislature
thought that juvenile court lawyers were to function in a special way.
True, the name "law guardian" suggests the role of wise friend as well
as legal counselor, but the statute nowhere expresses the view that the
term is actually anything but an attractive name designed, perhaps, to
muffle criticism of the Act's sponsors. On the contrary, words suggesting
a lawyer's traditional role are employed at significant points. The Act
affirms, "minors have a right to the assistance of counsel of their own
choosing or of law guardians in neglect proceedings ... and in proceed-
ings to determine juvenile delinquency.. . ." ' The law guardian for the
poor is thus equated with retained counsel. Further, the "law guardians"
are defined as "attorneys . . . designated . . . to represent minors. " ' I
The statute goes on to express "a finding that counsel is often indispen-
sible to a practical realization of due process and may be helpful in making
reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition. This
part establishes a system of law guardians to realize these purposes.1"52
The purposes, then, are: "realization of due process," "reasoned deter-
mination of fact," and "proper orders of disposition." No mention is
47. Whitlack, supra note 29.
48. Address, supra note 16.
49. N.Y. FAmmy Cr. AcT (McKinney 1963).
50. N.Y. FAmY CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 1963).
51. Id. § 242.
52. Id. § 241.
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made of seeing to it that a child who "needs" help receives it.
In short the legislature of New York, except for the use of the term
to describe the lawyers to be assigned to the indigent, gives no hint that a
lawyers acts improperly if he asserts all defenses and puts the state to its
proof.
There is need for a lawyer in juvenile court and, so it seems to the
author, a lawyer who acts as an advocate. He is to test the strength of the
petitioner's case, to challenge that which can be challenged, and to question
that which is open to question. There is no hint in Mr. Justice Fortas'
Gault opinion that an advocate's action, which could block an adjudication
by proper invocation of law or by appropriate challenge to the adequacy
of proof, ought not to be taken because adjudication and commitment
would benefit the child. Quite the contrary:
[t] he probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His
role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as
arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the
judge represent the child. There is no material difference in
this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort
here involved. In adult proceedings, this contention has been
foreclosed by decisions of this Court. A proceeding where the
issue is whether the child will be found to be delinquent and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assis-
tance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled
inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceed-
ings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare
and submit it. The child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step in the proceedings against him."5
Indeed, Mr. Justice Fortas has rejected the propriety of a lawyer's
role at the dispositional stage which is limited merely to being "helpful"
to the child and instead emphasized the need to put forth the best
affirmative case for him. In the Court of Appeals opinion in Kent'4-- a
case involving the procedural requirements appropriate to a proceeding to
determine whether the case of a sixteen year old should be transferred to
criminal court-that court stated that the lawyer's role was to present
"anything on behalf of the child which might help a court in arriving at a
decision; it is not to denigrate the staff's submissions and recommenda-
tions."55 Mr. Justice Fortas sharply disagreed with the court of appeals:
53. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
54. Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 541
(1966).
55. Id. at 258.
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"[o]n the contrary, if the staff's submissions include materials which are
susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel
to 'denigrate' such matter.""8 Mr. justice Fortas went on to say that in
respect to "critically important" decisions, the material which the judge
uses to reach his decision ought to "be subjected, within reasonable limits
having regard to the theory of the Juvenile Court Act, to examination,
criticism and refutation." 7 The language does not suggest that there is
a great difference between the task of a lawyer in a juvenile court and the
task of a lawyer in an ordinary criminal case.
A full exploitation of all of the rights of a child in juvenile court will
carry the consequence that some guilty youths will escape adjudication.
For some young persons this escape may not be, in ultimate terms, a
happy occurrence; if juvenile court treatment is beneficial, the beneficial
opportunity for the child will be lost. If it is destructive to the child's
character for him to go free if he is guilty, that corrupting lesson will be
learned in some cases. One cannot have it both ways if the juvenile court
is to function as part of the general legal system.
Granted that counsel is properly an advocate, ought not a lawyer
seek to achieve what is "best for the child" through persuasion? Should
not a lawyer urge a youngster to speak out and admit his guilt? Should
not counsel influence his client in proper cases to take advantage of a
regimen of character-building through probation or placement in an
institution devoted to child care?"s An affirmative answer puts the
lawyer-advocate in the role of a guardian of the person. In the author's
view, these roles are not happily united. This position has been articulated
by the Supreme Court of Vermont in In re Dobson:
[a]n attorney can effectively argue the alternative courses
open to a client only to one assumed to be capable of making
a discriminating choice. The minor is presumed incapable and
under disability, hence the need of a guardian ad litem to
weigh alternatives for him. Yet a lawyer attempting to function
as both guardian ad litem and legal counsel is cast in the
quandary of acting as both attorney and client, to the detri-
ment of both capacities and the possible jeopardizing of the
infant's interests. The counseling of minors called for by 33
56. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 563 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. Mr. Charles Schinitsky, Attorney in Charge, Family Court Branch of the
Legal Aid Society, New York City, has discussed the duty of a law guardian in New
York in relation to his cilent. See Paulsen, The Cons titutional Dozestication of the
Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 233, 262-264. Mr. Schinitsky concludes, "We do not
believe that it is the duty of a law guardian, or of any other attorney, to urge a child to
assist the state in securing his conviction."
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V.S.A. §678 is best provided by a separation of the roles of
guardian ad litem and attorney.59
There is one final point about the effects of a child's right to counsel.
If many lawyers examine, criticize, and refute information submitted to
the court by the probation staff at the dispositional stage of the proceed-
ing, we can predict a certain kind of difficulty for the court. The members
of the court staff may well see a useful role for lawyers at the fact-finding
or adjudicatory stage. If nothing else, television has instructed everyone
that counsel has a place at a hearing designed to answer the question, "did
he do it?" In contrast, few in the probation staff will take kindly to the
challenges put by lawyers to a probation officer's recommendations
regarding the disposition of an adjudicated delinquent. The questions
asked by advocates seem like an attack on the officer's professional
qualifications and his integrity. The staff is likely to view lawyers as
interlopers, as persons who will destroy a possible relationship between
the probation officer and the respondent, or as misguided amateurs
interfering with the benefits which can be derived from a court acting
upon expert information.
The staff, it is submitted, is quite mistaken in writing off the
contribution which a lawyer can make to a dispositional hearing. A
lawyer can articulate the point of view of a family which may be frighten-
ed, vulnerable, and without an articulate spokesman. He can bring new
suggestions to the mind of the judge. He can call attention to the
inadequate basis of some recommendations. At the dispositional stage
wise decision-making can also benefit from "constant, searching, and
creative questioning."6
NOTICE, A COMPLETE RECORD OF PROCEEDING,
AND SELF INCRIMINATION
Notice
In requiring that timely, specific, and written notice of a juvenile
court proceeding be given to a child and his parents, Gault has changed the
practice in many places in the country. In Ohio the officers of the Juvenile
Court Judges Association, immediately after Gault, gave warning to all
Ohio judges that a statute "which set forth that a complaint is sufficently
definite which merely alleges the child to be delinquent is no longer
valid."'" Judge Driscoll of Bridgeport tells of changing "our require-
59. 125 Vt. 165, 168, 212 A.2d 620, 622 (1965).
60. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENEAi.'s COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE AD-
M8INISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 10 (1963).
61. Address, supra note 16.
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ments with regard to the allegations in petitions of neglect, and to some
extent, those concerning delinquency as well."82 In Minneapolis, more
particularity is found on notices of violation of parole "even though this
does not appear to have been specifically required by the Gault case." 3
The concept of adequate notice not only embraces the point that a
respondent should understand the specific facts to which he is being called
to answer but also that the law which is being applied is sufficiently
precise to make defense possible and decision-making by the judge
rational. Many juvenile court acts are quite vaguely formulated, particul-
arly in those sections which permit a court to act in relation to a child who
has misbehaved but has not broken the law. For example, a California
statute provides that any child "who from any cause is in danger of
leading an idle, dissolute, lewd or immoral life, is within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court." 4 Such language presents a most serious con-
stitutional issue of due process of law. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts has just declared unconstitutional a portion of that state's
vagrancy statutes containing words similar to a portion of the language
quoted."5 The Massachusetts court overturned, on two grounds, the
conviction of one Albert Patch on a charge of being "an idle person who
not having any visible means of support has lived without lawful
employment" ;"8 the statute was struck down on the basis that (1) the
conduct could not fairly be classified as criminal and (2) the provision
was void for vagueness. Obviously the Massachusetts statute can be
distinguished from the California enactment. Yet the case illustrates a
new willingness to examine critically language which has withstood
constitutional challenge for many, many years. The case is important for
our concerns because it is in line with the most recent developments in
criminal law which have required greater particularity in the definition
of offenses.
A Complete Record
As Judge Toner noted in his speech to the Ohio judges, "Gault
does not hold that a record must be made in the juvenile court, but there
is a strong recommendation that his be done.""7 Judge Arthur of Minnea-
polis says, "[w]e are also expanding reporting services"" in response to
Gault. The "recommendation" of Mr. Justice Fortas' opinion has also
62. Driscoll letter, supra note 10.
63. Arthur letter, supra note 10.
4. CAL. W=nl. & INST'NS CODE § 601 (West 1963).
65. Alegata v. Commonwealth, - Mass.- , 231 N.E.2d 201 (1967). The
statute is MASs. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 272, § 66 (1956).
66. 231 N.E.2d at 205 (1967).
67. Address, supra note 16.
68. Arthur letter, .tpra note 10.
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borne fruit in Connecticut: "[w] e also have retained court stenographers
for every contested case.... We do not request a transcript unless there is
an appeal." 9 New court rules in New Jersey provide: "[t]he Admin-
istrative Director shall provide for the verbatim recording of all hearings
and times in all juvenile courts... either by a... stenographic reporter
. .. or by an electronic sound recording device. ' 7' The rules also make
free transcripts available to the indigent, a result which seems to follow
from the demands of the equal protection clause as they were formulated
in Griffin v. Illinois.7' The Colorado Children's Code of 1967 requires
that a "verbatim record shall be taken of all proceedings which might
result in the deprivation of custody. ' 72 Judge McKinney of Ames, Iowa
has summarized the reason for this recent trend:
... I think that the thing that Gault has awakened us to is the
making of a complete record in Juvenile Court, so that any
Juvenile Court Orders that are made can be justified upon an
appeal in that the entire record is available for the appellate Court.
7
However, more than a transcript of proceedings is required if
meaningful appellate review is to be afforded. Kent called for a statement
of a judge's reasons for his decision as well. A transcript which does not
include that information may be inadequate given the present approach
of the Supreme Court to juvenile cases.
The Privilege Against Self-incrimination
The correspondence with the judges indicates that the privilege
against self-incrimination is implemented, in some places, simply by
telling a child and his parents of the privilege immediately before the
hearing. "The procedure followed by the judges assigned to our Court is
to advise the parent and the juvenile of the right of the juvenile not to
testify."' Similarly, Judge Gentry of Greenboro, North Carolina, in
answer to a question about the implementation of the privilege states,
"[t]he child is not required to take the stand and testify against himself.
Also, when being questioned [by the court], he is advised of his right to
remain silent, and his right to have counsel present, or to have his
parents present.
75
Other judges report practices that give notice of rights under the
privilege long before the court hearing. Already illustrated is the sort of
69. Driscoll letter, supra note 10.
70. N.J. CT. R. 6:2-10.
71. 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
72. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(2) (Supp. 1967).
73. MeKinney letter, supra note 10.
74. Dahl letter, supra note 10.
74. Gentry letter, sulpra note 10.
JUVENILE COURTS
mimeographed notice sent to parents along with the summons. A letter
from Lincoln, Nebrsaka, describes practices which implement the privilege
during police interrogation in the preliminary processes of the juvenile
court, as well as in the courtroom itself :
... the present practice as well as the previous practice in
Nebraska was to advise the child and his or her parents
that the child has the privilege against self incrimination. This
was done at various stages of the proceeding and is presently
done at various stages of the proceeding. It is done prior to the
commencement of any court hearing, but it is also done prior
to the time any probation officer talks to the child, and so far
as we have been able to ascertain, it is done by the law enforce-
ment officials at the time they take the child into custody."'
A child's right to silence during interrogation, preliminary investi-
gation, and the hearings in court could bring the single most drastic
change in juvenile court proceedings, if the right is frequently invoked
with the help of vigorous counsel. Mr. Justice Harlan evidenced aware-
ness of this point in his opinion in Gault." He agreed that timely notice
and the assistance of counsel were required by due process. He would have
required that a complete record be made but he would not have applied
the privilege against self-incrimination, or the right to confrontation and
cross-examination to the juvenile court: "quite unlike notice, counsel, and
a record, these requirements might radically alter the character of juvenile
court proceedings." 8 He argued that these rights "would contribute
materially to the creation in these proceedings of the atmosphere of an
ordinary criminal trial. . . ."" It can be observed, further, that the
overwhelming number of adjudicated decisions have been entered after a
child's admission (in or out of court) even though other evidence might
have also been heard. Children in trouble have been encouraged to talk.
Talking was not only the first step toward rehabilitation, so it was
thought, but it also provided much needed information about the character
of the child and the sources of his trouble.
Has Gault brought Miranda v. Arizona8 ° to the juvenile court?
Under Miranda, it will be remembered, a suspect, taken into custody and
subjected to questioning, is entitled to "fully effective" notice of his right
to silence. He is entitled to a warning that he has a "right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
76. Nuernberger letter, supra note 10.
77. 387 U.S. 1, 65 (1967) (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 75.
79. Id.
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so
desires."'"
There is not really much doubt that some such set of safeguards
bind those officials who interrogate offending children. After all, the
Gault opinion does say, "[w]e conclude that the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with
respect to adults."82 This statement was preceded by the observation
that "[i]t would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to children."
'
Mr. Justice Fortas surely revealed his assumption that the privilege is
applicable in the police station as well as in the courts when he wrote,
"[t]he participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, Juvenile
Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege."8
The ultimate significance of a Miranda-type warning cannot be
estimated unless it is known how easily the right to remain silent during
custodial questioning can be waived. The waiver problem is exceedingly
difficult in respect to juveniles, as indeed Mr. Justice Fortas indicated:
[w]e appreciate that special problems may arise with respect
to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and that
there may well be some differences in technique-but not in
principle-depending upon the age of the child and the presence
and competence of parents."
Some recent case law has already begun to wrestle with the waiver
issue. For example, In re William L."8 raised the question of whether a
fourteen-year-old had waived his privilege of silence. The opinion de-
scribes the circumstances of the questioning:
William was awakened by four policemen at 3:00 a.m. on
November 7, 1966 at his home and brought to the 78th Precinct
squad office. His mother was told that a murder had been
committed in the neighborhood and that there was no proof
that William had done it, but that the police had been informed
that he was involved. She asked whether she might accompany
William to the police station and was told that it was not a
serious matter and that her son would be home in an hour or
tWp.
81. Id. at 479.
82. 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
93. Id. at 47.
84. Id. at 55 (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. - App. Div. 2d- , 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
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At the squad room William was questinoed by Detective
O'Rourke in company with four or five police officers. O'Rourke
testified: 'I told him he was entitled to a lawyer; that if he
did not have one we would get one; that I apprised him if he
wished to remain silent he could; and anything he said would
be used against him.' William did not respond to these warnings,
but 'stated he wanted to talk, and he said he wanted to tell
what happened.' The questioning of William and Charles,
another juvenile involved in the incident, was completed in
about an hour. Both William and Charles were charged with
delinquency at 5:00 a.m. William's mother was informed by
the police of the charge against William at 7:00 a.m."
The appellate court emphasized the fact that William's mother was not
present at the questioning and that she had never been informed of the
child's rights. The court overturned the adjudication based on William's
confession even though he had supposedly waived his constitutional
protections:
[w]e think it almost self-evident that a boy of 14, aroused from
sleep at 3:00 a.m., taken to a police station and questioned by
four of five police officers concerning a homicide, would
scarcely be in a frame of mind capable of appreciating the
nature and effect of the constitutional warnings given him
before the questioning begins. More than the making of the
confession alone is required in order to find a conscious and
understandnig waiver of the juvenile's rights. Indeed, even
apart from mandates of Gault and Miranda (supra), the cir-
cumstances of William's confession render it invalid under the
requirements of due process and the special conditions of care
which a juvenile's interrogation demands. The age and imma-
turity of the juvenile, both emotionally and intellectually, create
the need for the advice of counsel and his presence at the
questioning when charges of juvenile delinquency may ensue
(cf. Family Court Act, § § 724, 728, 741, 744).
In contrast, an opinion of the Supreme Court of California, People
v. Lara,9 has held that a boy not quite eighteen could competently waive
the privilege of silence at the accusatory stage of a criminal case. The
opinion rejected the notion that minors are incompetent to waive con-
stitutional rights as a matter of law. A conviction based upon the con
87. 287 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
88. 287 N.Y.S.2d at 221 (citations omitted).
89. 67 Cal.2d 475, 432 P.2d 282, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967).
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fession in Lara (a prosecution for murder) was upheld in spite of the
fact that the youth was a member of the Mexican-American minority
with a ninth or tenth grade education, was in poor physical condition at
the time of the questioning, and possessed a low I.Q. The court reasoned:
[t]o sun up, we have seen that a minor, even of sub-
normal mentality, does not lack the capacity as a matter of law
to make a voluntary confession without the presence or consent
of counsel or other responsible adult, or to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his right to counsel at trial; in either event,
the issue is one of fact, to be decided on the 'totality of the cir-
cumstances' of each case. We are of the opinion that the same
rule governs the issue of the effectiveness of a minor's waiver of
his rights to counsel and to remain silent after the accusatory
stage has been reached in a pretrial investigation."
The main point in the quotation is most important. By insisting that
the "same rule" governs the "voluntariness" of a confession and the issue
of whether or not a waiver has been made "knowingly and intelligently,"
the Lara opinion emphasized the question of how much pressure has been
put upon the suspect or how great of an inducement has been offered
prior to waiver. In other "waiver" contexts such as the waiver of a
trial through entering a plea of guilty, it is important to inquire how much
the suspect knows about the consequences of waiver. When the issue is
one of offering counsel, a respondent can be questioned regarding his
understanding of the value of counsel. One of the defendants in Laura
complained of his lack of knowledge before he waived the privilege:
Lara further complains, however, that the police did not inform
him of 'the elements of the crimes charged against him,' 'the
possible defenses available to him,' and the fact that 'he could re-
ceive the death penalty.' There is no requirement that an
accused be informed of these matters while the case is still in the
stage of interrogation by investigating officers. Indeed, it would
usually be impossible to do so, for at that stage no crimes have
yet been 'charged against him'; the latter decision is subsequent-
ly made by the district attorney, after appraising the legal
effect of the evidence gathered from all sources in the case.9
The court's response would not have met the defendant's contention if he
had complained that he had not been informed about the practical and
legal effects of a confession or an admission.
90. 432 P.2d at 219, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 603.
91. 432 P.2d at 210, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 594.
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Waiver problems not only raise some of the same issues as the confes-
sion case in respect to police pressure but also will involve efforts by
officials to induce a person to talk (or waive counsel). Consider, for
example, whether the following question and answer taken from a
pamphlet published by the Lane County, Oregon, Juvenile Department
would invalidate a waiver of the privilege if a child and his parent were
to read it at a probation officer's request:
Is a child required to answer questions or reveal any
information about himself prior to a juvenile court hearing?
No. He is not legally required to do so. However, it is
helped to the court staff to know and understand as much as
possible about each child before deciding whether his case should
go to court. The decision as to whether any service is needed,
or whether the matter even needs to come before the court, is
based upon more than the offense alone. 2
There is a bit of irony presented by the two waiver cases dis-
cussed above. Miranda has sometimes been defended as a prophylactic
rule. The traditional confessions cases are said to be difficult of applica-
tion because one could never truly know what pressures the police had
applied. Inquiry into that question usually resulted in a "swearing
contest" between the officers and the defendant. A rule like Miranda
supposedly would be much easier to apply. The two opinions, however,
suggest that all of the circumstances of an interrogation must be explored
in order to decide whether a waiver was given knowingly and intelli-
gently. If so, we have not moved very far toward a simple, mechanical
rule.
Automatic rules which do not require an inquiry into circumstances
are possible. Legislatures could deprive a minor of juvenile court age of
the power to waive constitutional rights. Judge Copeland of Topeka does
not permit waiver in certain cases: "[m]y practice has been that a
statement from any person under the age of sixteen (16) taken without
either an attorney or a parent present at the time the alleged 'waiver'
occurred is not admissible in evidence."93 The Colorado Legislature in
the Children's Code of 1967 permits the use of a child's statements only
if the child is supported by parents, guardian, or legal custodian:
[n]o statements or admissions of a child made as a result
of interrogation of the child by a law enforcement official
concerning acts which would constitute a crime if committed by
92. LANE COUNTY JuvENI DEPARTMENT, JUVENILE COURT 3 (1967).
93. Copeland letter, smpra note 10.
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an adult shall be admissible in evidence unless a parent,
guardian, or legal custodian of the child was present at such
interrogation, and the child and his parent, guardian, or legal
custodian were advised of the child's right to remain silent,
that any statements made may be used against him in a court
of law, the right of the presence of an attorney during such
interrogation, and the right to have counsel appointed if so
requested at the time of the interrogation."
Miranda, of course, applies only to (custodial) interrogation. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Illinois has held that the confession of a youngster
of fifteen, given without a prior waiver while he was not under arrest,
can be admitted in a criminal case. "All agree that Miranda does not
require police to interrupt a suspect in process of making a spontaneous
statement in order to warn him of his contsitutional rights," the Court
said." To the argument that a boy, handcuffed, taken from his family
and riding in a squad car on the way to the station, cannot be considered
to make a voluntary statement, the Court replied, "[i]t seems apparent
that his statement . . . was the product of a compulsive conscience or
otherwise psychologically motivated rather than the result of a coercive
atmosphere."9"
A confession is also admissible under Miranda if the suspect is not
in custody when he makes the statement. Such a situation, involving a
youngster charged with a crime, was found in People v. Rodney P.:
Daniel W. was arrested by police on May 1, 1966 in
connection with the theft of a 1963 Chevrolet. After some
questioning he identified the appellant, Rodney P., then 16
years old, as his accomplice. Since he knew where Rodney
lived (but not the precise address) Daniel directed two
detectives to Rodney's home. They arrived there at about
8:00 P.M. Detective Lally left Daniel in the car with his
fellow detective and approached three boys standing by the
side of the defendant's house. He asked which of the boys
was Rodney. The appellant identified himself, whereupon the
detective asked the other two boys if they would leave, which
they did.
The detective questioned Rodney about being with Daniel
W. that afternoon and taking the car. Rodney admitted to
Detective Lally that he had taken the car with Daniel W.
94. COLO. RaV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(c) (Supp. 1967).
95. People v. Orr, 38 Ill.2d 417, -, 231 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1967).
96. 231 N.E.2d at 428.
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This interrgation lasted three to four minutes. The detective
and Rodney next went inside the house and the officer spoke
to Rodney's father over the telephone regarding his son's
arrest. Rodney was taken to police headquarters where the
sum and substance of his conversation with the detective was
reduced to writing and signed by him. He was not advised at
any time of his rights either with regard to the assistance of
counsel or of his right to remain silent:" 7
The confession was held admissible because, even though the police
intended to arrest him, they had not yet done so. Miranda did not apply
because the suspect had not been deprived of his freedom of movement
nor, "as a reasonable person," was he led to believe that his freedom was
restrained in any significant way.
This is not the place to discuss the merits of these cases. They
illustrate problems which the juvenile court will now face-a set of
problems rarely brought into children's court before Gault.
RETROACTIVITY
Is Gault to be applied retroactively? This question has no single
answer. Gault decided the issues of the right to counsel, the applicability
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right of confrontation, the
necessity of sworn testimony and the adequacy of notice. It would seem
that retroactivity would be accorded Gault on all issues but the issue
regarding the privilege against self-incrimination. All others would seem
to relate to the integrity of the fact-finding process-the test of retro-
activity for the adult criminal cases.99
An interesting point was made in a recent New York opinion of the
Appellate Division, Second Department.9 It suggested that Gault be
given retrospective application to the date June 16, 1966 on the issue of a
child'-s right to silence during in-custody interrogation. It was on the
date mentioned that Miranda was decided. The court reasoned:
[w] e observe ... if William had been an adult, he would have
been entitled to the benefits of the Miranda principles, including
the discharge by the petitioner of the heavy burden of demons-
trating an understanding waiver by William of his rights. We
do not perceive any valid ground for denying William those
benefits simply because he is a child.'
97. 21 N.Y.2d 1, 3, 233 N.E.2d 255, 256 (1967).
98. See, e.g., Stovall .v Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
99. I re William L., - App. Div. 2d -, 287 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1968).
100. Id.-, 222.
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In State ex rel. La Follette v. Circuit Court of Brown County,'
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Gault was retroactive in respect
to the newly-recognized right to counsel. Ais the opinion demonstrates,
retroactive application affects many young persons in confinement, many
of whom may be quite dangerous :"[t]he pleadings in this action establish
that there are approximately 150 juveniles confined in the state refor-
matory who, as indigents, are presently processing petitions for the
appointment of counsel so that they may commence habeas corpus actions
based upon Gault."' 2 To insure that 150 offenders were not immediately
sent home, perhaps to disappear from view, the Wisconsin judges decided
that the juvenile inmates were not entitled to an absolute discharge but
only to a discharge from the institution in which they had been held and a
remand back to juvenile court. The opinion sets out a remand procedure
in detail:
[t]he ciruit court shall immediately mail a certified copy
of its order to the committing juvenile court. On receipt of
such copy of the order, the juvenile court shall direct the
sheriff of the county in which it exercises jurisdiction, either
in person, or by his undersheriff or a deputy, to proceed to
the reformatory and assume the custody of the juvenile and
transport him to the county in which the juvenile court sits.
It shall be the duty of the department or public welfare to
release custody to such sheriff, undersheriff or deputy sheriff.
The juvenile court, at the time it issues instructions to the
sheriff, shall direct that the juvenile, upon his arrival in such
county, be forthwith presented before such juvenile court.
Upon presentation of the juvenile before the juvenile
court, the court shall proceed as if the juvenile was then making
his initial appearance under an orginal petition....
THE BURDEN OF PROOF
It seems likely that Kent and Gault are the first in line of a long
parade of juvenile cases which the Supreme Court will decide over the
years. During the present October, 1967, Term of Court, two more cases
will be heard. In one of them, In re Whittington,"0 the adjudication of
a fourteen-year-old, based on circumstantial evidence, was upheld by a
court of appeals in Ohio on the ground that proof had been established
101. - Wis , 155 N.W.2d 141 (1967).
102. 155 N.W.2d at 145.
103. 155 N.W.2d at 149.
104. 13 Ohio App.2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 819
(1967) (No. 36 Misc.).
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according to the preponderance of the evidence. The court stated, " [t] he
proceeding being civil in nature and not criminal, a preponderance of the
evidence is sufficient to warrant a determination that a minor is a
delinquent, even though such determination involves a finding that a
criminal statute had been violated by such minor."''
The Supreme Court of Illinois recently handed down a contrary
decision respecting the burden of proof."0 6 The court was persuaded to
reach its position by the possibility that a child may lose his freedon for
a greater period than a person convicted of a crime involving an act
similar to the act of delinquency. "For this reason, we cannot say that it
is constitutionally permissible to deprive the minor of the benefit of the
standard of proof distilled by centuries of experience as a safeguard for
adults."'0°7 The Illinois court did not, however, extend the new standard
to dependency and neglect cases even though in such cases a child may be
removed from his parental home. The difference between delinquency
adjudication and a neglect determination was explained. In a neglect
proceeding, the court said, "the minor's liberty may not be infringed upon
by his commitment to an institution designed solely for the care of
delinquent children ... and he is not punished or regarded as a criminal
by society which is genuinely seeking to provide him with a proper
home." 08
The distinction is revealing. There is no question that a neglected
child may be separated from his parents for years, perhaps forever. He
may also find himself in a public or voluntary institution, and he is likely
to experience curtailment in his freedom of movement to some degree.
Yet informal proceedings may be used. The key to the difference between
a delinquency and neglect adjudication, for constitutional purposes, seems
to be the stigma of "delinquency" and the disturbing suggestion that,
with respect to a delinquent, society is not "genuinely seeking" to provide
the parental care which the founders of the juvenile court movement
posited as basic to the juvenile court.
The recently adopted New Jersey court rules employ the "reasonable
doubt" standard." 9 It must be said that a change in the quantum of
proof required will not, it seems probable, change many results in
adjudication. Few judges see themselves reaching an adjudication of
delinquency unless they are quite certain that the youngster committed
the act alleged. The adoption of a "reasonable doubt" standard, it is true,
105. 13 Ohio App.2d at -, 233 N.E.2d at 341. Accord, In re Wylie, 231
A.2d 81 (D.C. Mun. Ct App. 1967).
106. In re Urbasek, - II.2d-, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
107. 232 N.E2d at 720.
108. Id.
109. N.J. CT. R. 6:9-1(f).
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may have an effect on the willingness of appellate courts to reverse
occasionally, but the day-to-day operation of courts is not likely to be
transformed by it.
IN THE LONG VIEW
In coming Supreme Court terms we will learn more about a young-
ster's right to bail, to jury trial, and to counsel at the intake stage and
during the dispositional hearing. Whether evidence can be admitted over
the objection that it has been illegally obtained or whether hearsay can
be used remains an open question. Let us, however, assume that juvenile
court hearings and procedures become substantially similar to criminal
cases. Whaf will the effect be? An Ohio judge, when he heard of Gault,
is reported to have said, "the Supreme Court has ended the juvenile
court," and he announced immediate plans to dispose of all matters
pending before him."'
Justice Fortas surely had no such point of view. He held out hope
that the benefits of a court stressing rehabilitation might be continued-
even maximized:
[a] s we shall discuss, the observance of due process standards,
intelligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the
States to abandon or displace any of the substantive benefits
of the juvenile process.'
We do not mean by this to denigrate the juvenile court process
or to suggest that there are not aspects of the juvenile system
relating to offenders which are valuable. But the features of
the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of
unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestica-
tion. For example, the commendable principles relating to the
processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults
are in no way involved or affected by the procedural issues under
discussion. Further, we are told that one of the important
benefits of the special juvenile court procedures is that they
avoid classifying the juvenile as a 'criminal.' The juvenile offen-
der is now classed a 'delinquent.' There is, of course, no reason
why this should not continue. It is disconcerting, however, that
this term has come to involve only slightly less stigma than the
term 'criminal' applied to adults. It is also emphasized that in
practically all jurisdictions, statutes provide that an adjudication
of the child as a delinquent shall not operate as a civil disability
110. Address, supra note 16.
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or disqualify him for civil service appointment. There is no
reason why the application of due process requirements should
interfere with such provisions." 2
In any event, there is no reason why, consistently with
due process, a State cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate,
to provide and to improve provision for the confidentiality
of records of police contacts and court action relating to
juveniles." 3
While due process requirements will, in some instances, intro-
duce a degree of order and regularity to juvenile court pro-
ceedings to determine delinquency, and in contested cases will
introduce some elements of the adversary system, nothing will
require that the conception of the kindly juvenile judge be
replaced by its opposite, nor do we here rule upon the question
whether ordinary due process requirements must be observed
with respect to hearings to determine the disposition of the
delinquent child."
Judge Underwood was equally optimistic in the Illinois burden-of-proof
case: ' [t]he unique benefits that are derived from the special dis-
positional processes under the Act will not be diluted by the changes
made here at the adjudicatory stage.""'
Mr. Justice Fortas also doubted that informal procedures were
especially helpful in assisting troubled children. Recent studies, he pointed
out, have suggested "that the appearance as well as the actuality of
fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the essentials of due
process may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far
as the juvenile is concerned."")
1 6
We can expect, in my view, new legislation and court rules to em-
brace more procedural formality. Statutes and rules will probably require
more data to be recorded at each stage of the juvenile court proceeding
such as exactly who attended, who said what, and exactly what decision
was made.
Whatever the importance of more formal procedure and whatever
the answers may be to the procedural questions not yet resolved, Gault
has ultimate importance in terms of its spirit, its approach, and the way
112. Id. at22 (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 25.
114. Id. at 27.
115. People v. Urbasek, - II1.2d- , , 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1967).
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it views the juvenile court and its role. A draft of the Juvenile Procedures
Study Committee in Michigan which represents a tentative formulation
of rules for the juvenile court reflects this new spirit.'17 Rule 1.3 mern-
tions the importance of procedural rights and the interest of the public in
addition to the welfare and best interests of the child as guides for
construction:
[w] hile procedures shall not be deemed criminal, the court
and its officers, shall proceed in such manner as will safeguard
procedural rights, and the proper interests of the minor, the
minor's parents or legal custodians, and the public. These rules
shall be construed in keeping with the philosophy contained
in the preamble of the juvenile code to the end that each
child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive
such care, guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, as
will be conducive to the child's welfare and the best interests
of the state, and that when such child is removed from the
control of his parents the court shall secure for him care as
nearly as possible equivalent to the care which should have
been given to him by them, consistent with protection of such
procedural rights.'18
The Gault opinion is only one part of the juvenile court's legacy
from the year 1967. The other, to which Gault must be linked, is the
Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Admin-
istration of Justice. The Commission's Report fundamentally re-
jected the idea that a juvenile court, consistent with the plan of its
originators, is a gateway to services-a door through which troubled
children would pass to receive help. The relationship between Gault and
the Report has been summarized elsewhere:
[u]nlike the founders of the juvenile court, members of the
Commission had little faith in meeting the problem of delin-
quency by treating and 'curing' individual offender. '[D]elin-
quency,' the Report reads, 'is not so much an act of individual
deviancy as a pattern of behavior produced by a multitude of
pervasive societal influences well beyond the reach of action by
any judge, probation officer, correctional counsellor or psychia-
trist.' The problem requires new methods. A social disease,
delinquency should be attacked by economic and social mea-
sures, not by methods of effecting change in individuals. The
117. MICHIGAN JUVENILE PROCEDURES STUDY CO iirTTEE, RULES FOR JUVENILE
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Report urged improvements in schools, in housing, in employ-
ment opportunities, in occupational training programs, and
the strengthening of the family.' Court adjudication and dis-
position of those offenders, argued the Commission's task
force on juvenile delinquency and youth crime, 'should no
longer be viewed solely as a diagnosis and prescription for
cure, but should be frandy recognized as an authoritative court
judgment expressing society's claim to protection.' The task
force agreed that the youth of the offender argued for the
vigorous pursuit of rehabilitative efforts for the adjudicated,
but the' incapacitative, deterrent, and condemnatory aspects of
the judgment should not be disguised.'
The formal juvenile court system and its pronouncements
of delinquency, the Report said, 'should be used only as a last
resort.' The Report reflects a deep impression made by studies
indicating that a court adjudication is harmful to the young.
The drafters of the Report recommended that children be kept
away from the juvenile court's formal adjudication in as many
cases as possible. The Report urged the establishment of
youth services bureaus located in neighborhood community
centers that would be required to receive both delinquent and
non-delinquent children referred by police, parents, schools, and
other agencies. Each bureau should embrace a broad range of
services designed to assist young people with their problems.
It further recommended that juvenile courts make the
fullest feasible use of 'preliminary conferences' to allow for out-
of-court adjustments and settlements at the level of court intake.
A further device to avoid adjudication is contained in the
suggestion that juvenile courts employ consent decrees wherever
possible in the hope that the agreements to undertake rehabili-
tative treatment might free the respondent from the stigma
of adjudication and at the same time make certain that an
erring youth who needs it will undertake a treatment plan.
Gault prescribes procedure for the court of 'last resort.'
The supposed agency of salvation has become the instrument
for corruption. It is no longer a gateway to needed services
but a court for dealing with 'offenders for whom vigorous
measures seem necessary."
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of the impact of Gault in Ohio. As part of their report certain legislative
suggestions are made:
1. . . . consideration be given to a separation of the legal
procedures which handle delinquency matters (including traffic
violations of children) from those which handle child-welfare
matters (dependency, neglect, crippled children, etc.), so as to
prevent confusions and complications in the future.
2. Consideration should also be given by the legislative
commission to the elimination of all so-called "waywardness
clauses" from the definitions of juvenile delinquency in juvenile
court law, as covered by subsections B, C, D, and E in section
2151.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. These sections deal with
matters of being beyond control, habitual truancy from home
and school, deportment injurious to and endangering morals or
health, and attempts to enter into a marriage relationship
without consent of parents or guardians. Such non-delinquency
matters of children could be diverted by law to probate proce-
dures and to welfare agencies and institutions. America is about
to "decriminalize" drunkenness in adults and divert such cases
to detoxification centers. Certainly, we can consider the "de-
criminalization" of waywardness.
3. One of the boldest suggestions which might concern
a legislative commission would be the limitation of delinquency
by law to young persons 14 to 18 years of age, whereby all
children under 14 who committed a criminal or delinquent
act would not be dealt with as delinquent, no matter what
their offense. If a legislative commission became alerted to the
need for such a cutting point in age, it should send a small
delegation to Sweden and other Scandinavian countries to
examine how their laws, police, and courts work. In Sweden,
for example, the law indicates that no child under 15 can be
handled as a delinquent. If he comes to the attention of the
police, he must be diverted immediately to a welfare agency.'
These suggestions fit a court of "last resort." The very young, the merely
disobedient, and the neglected ought to be separated from the "toughs."
A similar suggestion was made by the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton, when it recommended a change in the Washington law to permit a
young offender in a minor traffic offense to be subject to appropriate
minor sanctions: "[tlo require the court to declare a juvenile to be a
121. Reckless & Reckless, The Initial Impact of the Gault Decision on juvenile
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delinquent child and a ward of the court for the violation of a relatively
minor traffic regulation is, in our opinion too harsh a required sanction
to be imposed."' 22
Finally, the juvenile court's new position may have important
effects, in the long run, on the court's role in the community. Juvenile
court judges have often acted as coordinators of community services for
children and as tribunes for the child in budget hearings and in legislative
halls. "The compelling needs of children unmet by specialists in schools,
hospitals, social agencies, and the community," writes Judge Justine
Wise Polier of New York City, "have repeatedly compelled the juvenile
court judge to become the generalist who must observe what is not being
done, attempt to coordinate needed services, and find some practical way
of filling the gap between compartmentalized services."' 23
Can or ought this role be played by a judge of the "new" juvenile
court? It may be that "community coordinators of youth services" or
"children's commissions" will take over the judge's lobbying work com-
pletely. Surely, the "1967-look" of specialized courts for children does
not leave us a court at the center of the enterprise of providing services
for children. One senses that 1967 has been the Year of the Big Change
for juvenile courts. The change is not properly seen, however, as merely
bringing more formal procedures to the juvenile court. The change
involves a revised conception of the court's role which will inevitably
generate new proposals respecting the kinds of cases this court should
hear and the kinds of the things judges should be called to do.
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